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Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,' the Supreme Court
elucidates a new standard to determine whether a state tax on international
commerce is valid under the Commerce Clause. Briefly, the criteria are as
follows:
1. the tax must be applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
to the taxing state;
2. be fairly apportioned;
3. not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
4. be fairly related to the services provided by the state.'
Further, a court must consider the possibility of multiple tax burdens
and the impairment of federal uniformity. If either of the last two precepts is
present, the state tax is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.
3
In formulating this standard, the Japan Line Court abandoned the
"Home Port" rule. This was done in order to develop a more unified approach
to determining the constitutionality of the exercise of state taxing power
under the Commerce Clause. The ruling in Japan Line reflects an awareness
of the need to examine the practical economic effects of state taxation on the
open international market. The new standard is one consistent with that in
the area of interstate commerce, of constitutional adjudication designed to
restrain state tax powers and to protect certain federal interests without
creating an excessively broad zone of tax immunity in the area of foreign
commerce. In the instant case, the state tax was held to be unconstitutional.
The new standard does not, however, require this result in all cases involving
international commerce. The Court is free to find a different result should
any of the factors significant to the decision change.
In 1970, 1971 and 1972, Japan Line, Ltd. and five other Japanese
corporations,4 engaged in the operation of vessels used exclusively in foreign
commerce between the United States and Japan, were notified of tax
assessments based upon a California statute levying an ad valorem personal
1. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
2. Id. at 444-45, citing, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977).
3. 441 U.S. at 451 (1979).
4. Other appellants are Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Mitsui 0. S. K. Lines,
Ltd., Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Showa Line, Ltd., and Yamashita Shinnihon Steamship
Co., Ltd.
(319)
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property tax' on the corporations' shipping containers.' The six Japanese
companies were incorporated under the laws of Japan, having their principal
places of business and commercial domiciles in that country. The corpora-
tions' vessels were registered in Japan and had their home ports there; they
were specifically designed to accommodate large shipping containers. The
containers, like the ships, were owned, based and registered in Japan and
were used exclusively for hire in the transportation of cargo in foreign
commerce.' All containers were subject to property tax in Japan and were, in
fact, taxed there.'
A number of the corporations' containers were present in the County of
Los Angeles and the City of Los Angeles on dates used by the municipalities
for tax computation purposes.9 The containers passed through the municipali-
5. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE, § 201 (West) states: "All property in this state, not
exempt under the laws of the United States or of this state, is subject to taxation under
this code." CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 205 (West) states:
(a) General Movable Property is all property which is intended to be, and is
moved from time to time from one location to another . . . Movable property has
situs where located on the lien date if it has been in the country for more than six
of the twelve months immediately preceding the lien date and if it is to remain in
or be returned to the country for any substantial period during the twelve months
immediately succeeding the lien date . . . Property which does not have a situs
where located on the lien date pursuant to the previous paragraph has situs at the
location where it is normally returned between uses or, if there is no such location,
at the principle place of business of the owner.
6. A container is a permanent reusable article of transport equipment . . . dur-
ably made of metal, and equipped with doors for easy access to the goods and for repe-
ated use. It is designed to facilitate the handling, loading, storage aboard ship, car-
riage, discharge from ship, movement and transfer of large numbers of packages simul-
taneously by mechanical means to minimize the costs and risks of manually processing
each package.
Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MARITIME L. & COMM. 507, 513 (1974).
See Customs Convention on Containers, Art. 1(b), May 18, 1957 (1969), 20 US.T. 301,
304, T.I.A.S. No. 6634. Although containers may be as small as 1 cubic meter (35.3
cubic feet), 49 C.F.R, § 420.3(c)(5) (1977), they are typically eight feet high, eight feet
wide, and between eight and 40 feet long. Simon at 510. See also 441 U.S. at 436.
7. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, App. 31 (1979). In
general, all containers carried by plaintiffs vessels, including the subject containers,
upon arriving from Japan are discharged from said vessel in the Port of Los Angeles
and either (a) transported by truck or fail to the ultimate inland destination of the
imported cargo contained therein; or (b) unloaded in Los Angeles harbor.
8. Id.
9. Under California law, a property tax year commences on the first day of July
of each year. The tax is however applicable to all property within the jurisdiction on the
preceding first day of March, which is commonly referred to as the "lien date." CAL.
REV. & TAX CODE § 401.3, § 219. 441 U.S. at 437.
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ties' jurisdictions intermittently. Some of the containers were in California at
any given time. A container's average stay was less than three weeks.'"
The municipalities levied property taxes in excess of $550,000 on the
assessed value of the containers present on March 1 of the three years in
question." The Japanese companies paid the taxes under protest and sued for
a refund in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. 2 The trial court
awarded judgment in the corporations' favor, holding that the containers
were instrumentalities of foreign commerce and therefore, under the "Home
Port" doctrine of Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
596 (1855), were immune from property taxation except in Japan. 3 The court
concluded that the application of appellee's taxes in derogation of the "Home
Port" doctrine subjected international commerce to multiple taxation, and
thus, was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause."' The court also held
that imposition of a property tax by the municipalities was inconsistent with
the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation between
the United States and Japan. 5
The court of appeals, following its decision in Sealand Service Inc. v.
County ofAlemeda," rejected the "Home Port" rule as anachronistic and held
10. The number of containers present in California on any arbitrarily selected date
is approximately 3/52 of the total number of containers that enter California at any
time during the tax year. The number of containers physically present in Los Angeles
County was representative of the number of containers present in Los Angeles County
on other dates throughout the tax year. Brief for U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 3.
11. The property tax rate applied to the containers during the years involved in
this case was approximately 11% of the assessed value, and the assessed value of the
property ordinarily is 25% of fair market value. 441 U.S. 434, J.S. App. A, § 16a. The
taxes levied by the county and city of Los Angeles for 1970 through 1972 are as follows:
Japan Line, Ltd. $100,632.85; Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., $117,616.44; Mitsui 0. S.
K. Lines, Ltd., $111,255.25; Nippon Yusen Kaisha, $110,175.04; Showa Shipping Co.,
Ltd. $50,640.69; Yamashita Shinnihon Steamship Co., Ltd., $69,416.39 (excluding in-
terest). 441 U.S. at App. 34 (1979).
12. 441 U.S. at 437.
13. The opinion of the Superior Court was not officially reported. 441 U.S. at 437.
See 441 U.S. at App. 39 (1979).
14. "In so holding, the Superior Court followed Scandinavian Airlines System Inc.
v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 899 (1961) (ruling that ad valorum property tax levied by California upon aircraft
owned, based and registered abroad and used exclusively in international commerce,
was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause)." 441 U.S. at 438.
15. 441 U.S. at App. 39 (1979).
16. 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56 (1974). In Sea Land, the California Supreme Court
held that the state could levy an apportioned ad valorem property tax on cargo ship-
ping containers used mainly in foreign commerce but owned by a shipping company
domiciled in another state.
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that instrumentalities of foreign commerce were subject to apportioned
property taxation.,7 In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals rejected the argument that a different result was required because of
the containers' foreign ownership and exclusively international use, dismis-
sed any argument as to multiple taxation,'8 and concluded that the treaty
provisions had no application to state or local property taxation of instru-
ments of foreign commerce."
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals with some expansion and editorial emendations as its own opinion."
The Court stated "the threat of double taxation from foreign taxing
authorities has no role in Commerce Clause considerations of multiple
burdens, since burdens in international commerce are not attributable to
discrimination by the taxing state and are matters for international
agreement."'" Deeming the containers foreign ownership and use irrelevant
for purposes of constitutional analysis,2" the Court rejected appellant's
Commerce Clause challenge and sustained the validity of the tax as applied."
The U.S. Supreme Court noted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257(2)"4 and
reversed the ruling of the Supreme Court of California, striking down state
17. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 3d 562, 563, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 531, 533 (1976).
18. See note 98 infra and accompanying text.
19. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35.
20. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905, 571 P.2d 254
(1977). It is important to note that Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Japan Line "substantially for the reasons set forth by Justice Manu-
el in his opinion for the unanimous Supreme Court of California", 441 U.S. at 457.
21. 141 Cal. Rptr. at 908, 571, P.2d at 257.
22. Id. at 908-09, 571 P.2d at 257-58.
23. Id. at 911. 571 P.2d at 288-59.
24. 441 U.S. at 441. Decisions of "the highest court of a state" which involve "the
validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitu-
tion" are reviewable "by appeal" in the U.S. Supreme Court when the state court "deci-
sion [was] in favor of [the statute's] validity." 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2) (1970). In Japan
Line, "appellants drew in question the validity of California's ad valorem property tax,
contending the tax, as applied to their containers, was repugnant to the Commerce
Clause and various treaties, and the California Supreme Court sustained the validity of
the tax." Id. at 440. "Under these circumstances, [the Supremel Courts appellate juris-
diction would seem manifest." Id. at 440." "IA] state statute is sustained within the
meaning of § 1257 (2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts
as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal grounds." Id. at
441.
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taxation of the instrumentalities of foreign commerce2'- as unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause. In so doing, the Court declined to rest its
decision upon the "Home Port" doctrine,26 focusing instead upon the practical
effects of such a tax. The Court perceived the issue in Japan Line as "whether
instrumentalities of commerce that are owned, based and registered abroad
and that are used exclusively in international commerce, may be subjected to
apportioned ad valorum property taxation by a state."" The Court announced
that in order to answer this question not only is a consideration of the
Complete Auto Transit test necessary - i.e., the tax must be applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state, be fairly apportioned,
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and be fairly related to the
services provided by the state' - but the possibility of multiple tax burdens
and of the impairment of federal uniformity must also be considered.3 If the
state tax contravenes either of the last two criteria, it is unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause."
25. Id. at 454. The court held shipping containers constituted instrumentalities of
foreign commerce both "as a matter of fact and as a matter of law." Id. at 446. Appel-
lants' containers entered the United States pursuant to the Customs Convention on
Containers, Customs Convention on Containers Art. I(b) May 18, 1956 1969 20 U.S.T.
301, T.I.A.S. No. 6634, which grants containers "temporary admission free of import
duties and import taxes and free of import prohibitions and restrictions," provided they
are used solely in foreign commerce and are subject to re-exportation. 20 U.S.T. at 304.
Similarly, 19 CFR § 10.41a(a)(3) (1978) designates containers "instruments of interna-
tional traffic," with the result that they "may be released without entry or the payment
of duty" under 19 U.S.C. § 1322(a). See 19 CFR § 10.41a(a)(1) (1978). A bilateral tax
Convention between Japan and the United States associates containers with the vehi-
cles that carry them, and provides that income "derived by a resident of a Contracting
State . . .from the use, maintenance, and lease of containers and related equipment
• . .in connection with the operation in international traffic of ships or aircraft. . . is
exempt from tax in the other Contracting State." Convention Between the United
States of America and Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, [1971,1 23 U.S.T.
967, 1084-1085, T.I.A.S. No. 7365. 441 U.S. at 446 n.10.
26. 441 U.S. at 443. See discussion of "Home Port" doctrine at 325 Infra.
27. Id. at 444.
28. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 374 (1977).
29. 441 U.S. at 445.
30. Id. at 451. The questions to be asked are: (a) whether the tax, notwithstanding
apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation;. and (b)
whether the tax prevents the federal government from "speaking with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments."
31. Id.
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THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's analysis focused first upon the inappropriateness of
application of the "Home Port" Doctrine established in Hays v. Pacific Mail
Steamship Co. 3 2 In Hays, the state of California assessed an ad valorem
personal property tax upon a New York company's steamships used to
transport passengers and cargo between Central America and ports in
California and Oregon. The steamships remained in California for short
periods of time. The Court declared the tax invalid and announced the rule
that the "home port" of a vessel was its "situs" for taxation purposes; thus, no
state other than New York, where the vessels were registered, had
"jurisdiction" to tax them.3
It must be noted that this decision was rendered before the fourteenth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution took effect, and that the court did not
discuss any question in terms of constitutional principles. The statute
involved was the statute of California for the taxation of property generally.
The case was decided upon what the Supreme Court assumed to be the law of
California as to common law jurisdiction to tax tangible movable property
and as to the scope and effect of the California taxation statute.
As a corollary, the Court assumed that only New York had the power to
tax the vessels.3' The grounds for this assumption are obscure; whether the
taxing power resides in the state of the port of registry or in the owner's
domicile was left unresolved, as the two coincided in New York.
Prior to the decision in Japan Line, at least one court :15 interpreted the
"Home Port" rule of Hays as having a constitutional basis; reference to the
lack of a taxable situs3" giving credence to the claim that the doctrine was
placed, in part, upon due process considerations; :'7 a statement in Hays"' "to
32. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855).
33. Id. at 599-600. "We are satisfied that the State of California, had no jurisdic-
tion over these vessels for the purpose of taxation . . . they were there but temporarily,
engaged in lawful trade and commerce, with their situs at the home port, where the
vessels belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested,
and where the taxes had been paid." This ruling was termed the "Home Port" doctrine.
See Limitations on State Taxation of Foreign Commerce: The Contemporary Validity of
the Home Port Doctrine, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1979).
34. Page, Jurisdiction to Tax Tangible Movables, 1945 Wis. L. Rzv. 125, 144
(1945).
35. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25,
363 P.2d 25, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
36. Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596, 598 (1854).
37. See supra note 35.
38. U.S. (17 How.) 596, 599 (1854).
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the effect that regulation of foreign and interstate commerce belongs to the
Inationall government, indicatling] that the Court also predicated the
doctrine, in part, upon the commerce clause, even in the absence of any
federal enactment on the subject."3 9 Rejection of this interpretation of the
"Home Port" rule by the Japan Line Court apparently rests on the erosion of
the "Home Port" doctrine in cases after Hays." The Japan Line Court
recognized that in the area of interstate commerce "the 'Home Port doctrine'
as a rule for taxation of moving equipment has yielded to a rule of fair
apportionment among the states."'" Consistent application of apportionment
taxation to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce did not, however,
necessarily require the Court in Japan Line to abandon the "Home Port" rule
with regard to the instrumentalities of foreign commerce.
THE HOME PORT RULE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
The Hays opinion stated that a vessel operating on the high seas in
interstate commerce is subject to admiralty law, even when lying in domestic
port, other than her port of registry, and as such differs from vessels which
remain wholly within national waters."2 The concept appears to have been
that vessels operating upon international waters were subject to a completely
different set of rules than vessels operating in national waters. Thus, it was
argued
the earliest statement of the "Home Port" doctrine granted the state of
domicile the power to tax in full, denied to all other jurisdictions any
power or right to tax, except as might arise under the police power,
when a vessel engaged in either interstate or foreign commerce used the
open seas as a highway between ports."
Prior to Japan Line, the court never specifically addressed the issue of state
property taxation of ocean going vessels and their instrumentalities engaged
solely in foreign commerce. The Court, however, has been careful to
distinguish the case of ocean going vessels engaged in foreign commerce in
dicta. These statements are found in the interstate commerce cases estab-
lishing the apportioned taxation rule."
39. See supra note 35.
40. 441 U.S. at 443.
41. Id. at 442.
42. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596, 598 (1855).
43. See supra note 35.
44. Pullmans Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); Ott v. Mississip-
pi Valley Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169 (1949); Braniff v. Nebraska State Board of Equali-
zation & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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In Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania,5 the Court recognized a
non-domicilary state's power to tax land-based instrumentalities of interstate
commerce in a decision involving railroad rolling stock. The Court disting-
uished railroad rolling stock from ocean going vessels: whereas ships travel
on navigable waters, have a home port and touch land only incidentally,
rolling stock has no fixed situs and continually traverses the various states. 6
The Pullman court differentiated between federal interests in interstate and
foreign commerce: "the vehicles of commerce by water are instrumentalities





The Supreme Court next addressed the issue of state apportioned-
taxation at each port of call versus full taxation at the home port in a decision
involving taxation of water carriers engaged in interstate commerce.48 In Ott
v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line,"0 the Court permitted imposition of an
apportioned tax upon vessels engaged in inland river traffic.'" The line of
decisions which had established that vessels are taxable solely by the
domiciliary state ' was distinguished on the ground that when the "Home
Port" rule was formulated, there had yet to be developed the concept of
taxation on an apportioned basis.2
45. 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
46. Id. at 23.
47. Id. at 24. The court permitted Pennsylvania an apportionment method of taxa-
tion.
48. Ott, see supra note 44. Prior to Ott the Court decided Northwest Airlines v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944), a case involving a fleet of airplanes owned and oper-
ated by a Minnesota corporation, registered in that city as the home port, and operating
from that base in interstate commerce. The Court held that the Minnesota property tax
levied on a full ad valorem basis did not violate either the commerce clause or the due
process clause. Id. at 295. Although the result suggests adherence to the "Home Port"
doctrine, the Court did not expressly address the issue of apportionment taxation by
other states and was so divided that no majority opinion could be written.
49. 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
50. Id. at 174-75.
51. The "Home Port" doctrine was reaffirmed as to ocean going vessels, in Morgan
v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 471, 476-77 (1873) (reliance on commerce clause by the
Court to invalidate nondomiciliary state property taxation of coastal vessels). "[It is an
interference with the commerce of the country not permitted to the states." Id. at 479.
Similarly, the doctrine was applied in Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63,
69 (1911). It was applied to vessels moving in inland waters in St. Louis v. Ferry Co.,
78 U.S. (11 Wall) 423 (1871), and in Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409,
421-23 (1906).
52. See notes 89-92 and accompanying text infra.
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The limitation imposed by the due process clause was succinctly stated in
Ott: "So far as due process is concerned, the only question is whether the tax
in practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection
conferred or afforded by the taxing State."" The Court conceded that the
Commerce Clause demands a proper apportionment of value among the
various states in which the instrumentality has become susceptible to ad
valorem taxation in order to mitigate the risk of multiple taxation. In Ott,
the court declared "Iwie do not reach the taxability of ocean carriage but
confined our decision to transportation on inland waters.""
Then, in Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and
Assessment,56 the Court sustained an apportioned ad valorem property tax
levied by a nondomiciliary state on airplanes of an interstate carrier making
regularly scheduled stops within the state. Eighteen stops per day pursuant
to a regular schedule over fixed routes constituted "sufficient contact" with
the state to satisfy the due process requirement. The Court held that the
Commerce Clause presented no bar because interstate commerce was not
burdened. "ITIhe commerce clause does not immunize interstate instrumenta-
lities from all state taxation, . . . such commerce may be required to pay a
non discriminatory share of the tax burden."57
In Braniff, the challengers of the apportioned tax analogized their
position to cases involving ocean going vessels, relying on Hays in particular.
The Court, however, found a closer analogy between planes flying interstate
and boats that ply the inland waters.' While Braniff represents the
culmination of the erosion of the "Home Port" rule with regard to interstate
53. 336 U.S. 169, 174-75 (1949). The Court inferentially overruled the St. Louis v.
Ferry Co. decision, see supra note 52, holding that there was no distinction in terms of the
due process clause for the commerce clause between vessels and railroad cars when each
moved between the States by exclusively inland routes. Id. at 174.
54. Id. at 174. Until Ott, the Commerce Clause problem of multiple taxation had
not been expressly considered.
55. Id. at 173-74.
56. 347 U.S. 590 (1954). Prior to the decision in Braniff, the court decided Stan-
dard Oil v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952), holding that a defined part of the domiciliary
corpus, an inland water fleet owned by an Ohio corporation, registered in Ohio and
traversing in non domiciliary waters, had acquired a taxable situs elsewhere. Follow-
ing Ott, the fleet could be taxed by the nondomiciliary states on an apportionment
basis. The domiciliary state could not impose a full ad valorem personal property tax as
such imposition would result in multiple taxation. 342 U.S. at 384-385. See Develop-
ments in the Law - Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75
HARV. L. REV. 953, 983-4 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Developments).
57. 347 U.S. at 597-98.
58. Id. at 600. The latter was declared taxable in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
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commerce, by specifically rejecting the analogy to ocean going vessels, the
Braniff court left the "Home Port" rule intact with regard to state taxation of
the instrumentalities of foreign commerce.
Stating that "to rehabilitate the . . . doctrine . . . would be somewhat
odd. . . and to hold. . . that liti survives would be to prove too much,"'' l the
Supreme Court in Japan Line declined to cast its analysis of the instant case
in the mold of the "Home Port" rule. The Court refuted the viability of the
"Home Port" doctrine with regard to instrumentalities of foreign commerce."'
If an ocean going vessel could indeed be taxed only at its home port,
taxation by a non-domicilary state would be barred, regardless of
whether the vessel were domestically or foreign owned and regardless of
whether it were engaged in domestic or foreign commerce."'
Application of the "Home Port" Doctrine would be both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive - allowing the use of international routes to render an
instrumentality of commerce immune from taxation in a nondomiciliary
state,6 while failing to address the issue of apportionment tax liability
according to the protection and other benefits received from that state.6 The
court abandoned the rule, and in so doing, left itself free to formulate a new
standard.
APPLICATION OF THE COMPLETE AuTo TRANSIT V. BRADY TEST"
Secondly, the Supreme Court focused upon application of Complete Auto
Transit to the facts of Japan Line.
Appellees contend that cargo shipping containers, like other vehicles of
commercial transport, are subject to property taxation, and that the
taxes imposed here meet Complete Auto's fourfold requirements. The
containers, they argue, have a "substantial nexus" with California
because some of them are present in that State at all times; jurisdiction
to tax is based on "the habitual employment of the property within the
State," Braniff, 347 U.S. at 601, and appellants' containers habitually
59. 441 U.S. at 443.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 443-44.
63. State Taxation of International Air Transportation, 11 STAN. L. REv. 518, 530
(1959).
64. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See 9 SEroN HALL L. REV. 910 (1978).
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are so employed. The tax, moreover, is "fairly apportioned," since it is
levied only on the containers' "average presence" in California. The tax
"does not discriminate," thirdly, since it falls evenhandedly on all
personal property in the State, indeed, as an ad valorem tax of general
application it is of necessity nondiscriminatory. The tax, finally, is
"fairly related to the services provided by" California, services that
include not only police and fire protection, but the benefits of a trained
work force and the advantages of a civilized society.
These observations are not without force. We may assume that, if
the containers at issue here were instrumentalities of purely interstate
commerce, Complete Auto would apply and be satisfied, and our
Commerce Clause inquiry would be at an end.6'
Although the court in Japan Line did not emphasize the background of
Complete Auto Transit, an analysis of the case is useful to show the Court's
move toward a more uniform approach to the problems of state taxation of
interstate and foreign commerce. Complete Auto Transit involved a Mississip-
pi tax on the privilege of doing business within the state levied on every
business transporting property for compensation. The tax was measured by
the gross receipts from the business. The taxpayer, a Michigan corporation,
hauled motor vehicles to dealers in Mississippi from a railroad depot in
Jackson, Mississippi, where they had been shipped from out of state assembly
plants. The vehicles were normally loaded on Complete's trucks and delivered
to Mississippi dealers within forty-eight hours after arrival in Jackson.
Complete alleged that its transportation services were an integral part of
interstate movement, so that the imposition of the tax violated the commerce
clause.6 In light of the assumption made by both the Mississippi court and
the Supreme Court that the transportation services under consideration
constituted interstate rather than intrastate commerce, the taxpayer's
contention - at least on its face - did not lack force.
The question of the limits of state taxation of interstate commerce has
been addressed by the Court from the earliest days of constitutional
interpretation. Chief Justice Marshall recognized the pervasive nature of
congressional control over interstate commerce in his landmark opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden.67 The Court, however, soon acknowledged that states could
65. 441 U.S. at 445.
66. 430 U.S. at 277 (1977).
67. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The Court in Gibbons held that the right of the
plaintiff to navigate in the waters between New York and New Jersey in contravention
of a New York statute which purported to confer exclusive navigation rights upon
certain individuals, Id. at 2, was within the meaning of commerce as used in the Con-
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exercise some authority over those aspects of interstate commerce which,
while within the scope of Congressional power, were not in their nature
"national."'" In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,69 the Court prescribed the inquiry
into the subject matter of a regulation: whether the federal interest in the
freedom of interstate commerce required uniformity.0 If so, any state
regulation was prohibited, even in the absence of express congressional
action.7 If, however, the subject matter was such that a state's regulations
would not interfere with the federal interests protected by the commerce
clause and the subject matter was not explicitly addressed in congressional
legislation, the states were free to regulate.72
Because the Court first interpreted the commerce clause as a charter to
maintain "free trade" in interstate and foreign commerce,73 one of the
fundamentals of the Commerce Clause doctrine was that an enterprise doing
exclusively interstate business could not constitutionally be subjected to a
state tax on the privilege of doing business in a particular state."
stitution. Id. at 189-93. Chief Justice Marshall asserted that when a state attempts "to
regulate commerce . . . among the several states, it is exercising the very power...
granted to Congress." Id. at 199. The Court found "great force in the argument" that
the power "'to regulate' implies . . . full power over the thing to be regulated . . .
excluding necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same thing". Id.
at 209. While it was acknowledged that, in regulating its internal affairs, a state might
enact laws which appeared to regulate commerce it was concluded that any such law
which conflicted with legislation enacted by Congress would be invalid. Id. at 209-10.
See 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 910, 912 n.15; See generally Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419, 445-47 (1827); P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
22-23 (1953).
68. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 319 (1851). In Cooley, the
Court was confronted with the validity of a state statute regulating navy pilotage. Id.
at 311-312. In upholding the statute, the Court recognized a distinction between
aspects of commerce more properly regulated by local authorities and those which re-
quire a "uniform system" of regulation. Id. at 319. The Court concluded that the regula-
tion of pilots was "local" in nature and as such, was best provided for "by as many laws
as the legislative discretion of the Several States should deem applicable." Id.
69. See supra note 68.
70. Id. at 318, 319.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 319-21.
73. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
74. See Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 393 (1952); Nel-
son Randolf v. Kent, 279 U.S. 245 (1929); Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme
Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication?, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1426, 1443 (1977) (hereinafter cited as State Taxation).
JAPAN LINES LTD. V. COUNTY OF Los ANGELES
In later cases, the Court greatly narrowed the scope of this tax immunity
and developed a multiple taxation doctrine. 75 The privilege concept was,
however, never explicitly abandoned;"6 and this practice led to a distinction
between cases that became increasingly gossamer.77 In the light of these
75. For example, in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948), the
Court revoked the privilege by identifying "local incidents" of interstate business which
the states could properly tax. Id. at 86-96.
76. In Spector Motor Services, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), the Court
invalidated a Connecticut tax assessed against a corporation found to be engaged in
"exclusively interstate" business. The Court ruled that any tax upon the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce impinged upon the congressional taxing power and
thereby rendered the tax unconstitutional. Id. at 608-610. In contrast, the Court
appeared to sanction state taxation of exclusively interstate business in several deci-
sions summarily affirming state court rulings. See Field Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 47
Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955), affd per curiam, 352 U.S. 806 (1956); West Pub.
Co. v. McCoglan, 28 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, af'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
The inconsistency of these developments reached its climax in Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
"In Northwestern, the court held that the commerce clause did not preclude a state
from imposing a fairly apportioned, non-discriminatory net income tax upon an
out-of-state corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in the taxing
state. At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Spector.
[The distinction appears to have been the formal subject of the tax.] In Northwest-
ern the subject was the corporation's net income, in Spector it was the privilege of
doing business. Since the measure of the taxes at issue in both cases was the
corporations net income, the immunity that exclusively interstate commerce en-
joyed from state taxation apparently depended upon whether [the taxing statute
was properly labeled.]"
State Taxation, supra note 74 at 1444. Illustrative of this result was the Court's hand-
ling of the Railway Express cases. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S.
434 (1959); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954). In Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia I, 347 U.S. 359 (1954), the Court invalidated applica-
tion of a tax levied for the privilege of doing business on a multistate corporation. 347
U.S. at 360-364. In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia II, the Court upheld tax
with the same economic effect where denominated as a franchise tax. 358 U.S. at 445.
77. The Court's analysis in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Triangle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975),
illustrates this development. In Colonial, an interstate pipeline taxpayer, conducting
an exclusively interstate business in Louisiana, was held taxable for the privilege of
doing business "in corporate form." 421 U.S. at 101. The case presented a particularly
dramatic illustration of the illusory nature of the privilege concept because the same
taxpayer had successfully resisted imposition of an earlier version of essentially the
same tax that had been imposed on the privilege of doing business, rather than the
privilege of doing business in a corporate form. Thus, with a minimum of legislative
surgery, a state assembly was able to deprive the taxpayer of his tax immunity, there-
by lending credence to Justice Blackmun's statement that to distinguish between "the
conduct of business in interstate commerce" and "the conduct of business in interstate
commerce in corporate form" as the incidence of a taxing statute was taxation by
semantics. Id. at 115 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See 70 Nw.U.L. REv. 835 (1976).
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inconsistent developments, the Court decided Complete Auto Transit v.
Brady.
8
Finding a trend "toward a standard of permissibility . . . based upon
• . actual effect,'" 9 Justice Blackmun, for the Court, described the gradual
erosion of the privilege doctrine in the face of the emerging principle that a
tax would be sustained against a commerce clause challenge as long as it is
"applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, is
fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is
fairly related to the services provided by the state."8 The Court offered no
original modes of analysis for the evaluation of a given tax, substantially
reaffirming a pragmatic approach developed in prior cases, but extending the
approach to cases involving purely interstate business.8 ' While Complete Auto
Transit signaled a move away from formalism in addressing tax issues,
nothing in the case was indicative of an approach intended to grant great
latitude to the states in their taxation of interstate commerce. The Court was
careful to note that taxes of this type present an "increased danger" of
"forbidden effect" upon interstate commerce, requiring close judicial scru-
tiny. 2 Further, the Court indicated that privilege taxes were not unique in
this regard and that property and income taxes could be used discriminatorily
as well." By focusing entirely upon the way in which a particular state or
local action was thought likely to disrupt the open national market, the Court
was, in fact, adopting a more unified coherent approach to the restraints
imposed by the Commerce Clause on the state taxing power of interstate
commerce. Thus, it can be argued that where state ad valorem property
taxation contains certain inherent dangers requiring careful scrutiny by the
Court to determine whether it produces a forbidden effect upon commerce, the
Complete Auto Transit test must be applied. The application of Complete Auto
Transit to the disposition of Japan Line exemplifies this argument. The
Court, in stating that "assuming, arguendo,... the tax passes muster under
Complete Auto",' appears to be applying the Complete Auto Transit
considerations to all forms of state taxation of commerce. No other conclusion
is justifiable in light of the application of a test formulated to determine
whether a state doing business tax is validly imposed upon interstate
commerce, to the question of whether a state ad valorum property tax is
validly imposed upon instrumentalities of foreign commerce.
78. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
79. Id. at 281.
80. Id. at 277-78, 287.
81. Id. at 277-78.
82. Id. at 288-89 n.15.
83. Id.
84. 441 U.S. at 451.
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FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS NECESSARY IN THE
AREA OF FOREIGN COMMERCE
The Japan Line court rejected the argument that Commerce Clause
analysis is identical regardless of whether interstate or foreign commerce is
involved." Finding that the defendant's shipping "containers . . were
instrumentalities of foreign commerce, both as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law, ' the Court held that when construing Congress' power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, a more extensive constitutional
inquiry is required."
The Fear of Multiple Taxation.
In considering state taxation of interstate and foreign commerce,
particularly instrumentalities of such commerce, a primary focus of analysis
under the Commerce Clause has been the problem of actual or potential
taxation by several jurisdictions. Multiple taxation places interstate or
foreign commerce at a disadvantage because intrastate activities do not bear
the same burden.
Generally, the apportionment principle in the area of interstate com-
merce is that a non-domiciliary state may tax a percentage of the value of the
transient personal property, under a formula which relates the tax to the use
of the property within the state. Multiple taxation is avoided by requiring the
domiciliary state to reduce the proportion of its tax base by the proportion of
the tax base upon which the other states can constitutionally levy,' whether
or not such other states have actually levied a tax." The principle does not,
however, resolve certain difficulties - various states levying a tax on an
apportioned basis may utilize different formulae, each using the taxing
method most advantageous to itself.9 Nevertheless, the Court views the
apportionment method of taxation as a satisfactory resolution to the states'
desire to have instrumentalities of interstate commerce "pay their own way,"
and the principle that interstate commerce should not be burdened with
multiple taxation. 1
85. Id. ht 446.
86. Id. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
87. Id.
88. This statement may require refinement. 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 92, 94-94 n.17
(1962).
89. Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 326 (1944); Standard Oil Co. v.
Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
90. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 515-16 (2d ed. 1977).
91. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess, 347 U.S. 590,
598 (1954).
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Constitutional principles governing the tax liability of foreign-owned,
registered and taxed shipping containers differ from the constitutional
principles applicable to shipping containers operating solely in interstate
commerce. In the context of foreign commerce, the Japan Line Court focused
upon the fact that "neither this Court nor this nation can ensure full
apportionment when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign."92
[T]he absence of any authoritative tribunal with the capacity to ensure
that the aggregation of taxes is not computed on more than full value
dictates that the interest of a state in taxing international [shipping
containers] on a parity with purely national [carriers] be sacrificed, lest
international shipping operations be substantially impaired.93
Inherent in this argument is a recognition of the court's inability to control
taxation by foreign countries, and of a "risk of a double tax burden to which
domestic commerce is not exposed and which the commerce clause forbids."9
Secondly, the Court, in considering the multiple tax issue, found certain
facts to be controlling: the containers were owned, based and registered in
Japan, they were used exclusively in foreign commerce, and California's
imposition of the tax resulted in a multiple tax in fact.95 "Appellant's
containers not only 'are subject to property tax . . . in Japan', . . . but,...
'are, in fact, taxed in Japan'. Thus if appellee's levies were sustained,
appellants 'would be paying a double tax'."9
The Supreme Court rejected appellee's contention that any multiple
taxation in this case is attributable, not to California, but to Japan.97 The
92. 441 U.S. at 447.
93. Id. at 448. See supra, Developments note 56, at 986.
94. 441 U.S. at 448.
95. Id. at 451, 452.
96. Id. at 452. The Court stated "we have no occasion here to decide under what
circumstances the mere risk of taxation would invalidate a state tax or whether this
risk would be evaluated differently in foreign, as opposed to interstate commerce." Id.
n.17.
97. Id. at 454. Prior to the decision in Japan Line, it was argued that the problem
of unapportioned taxation by foreign countries is better viewed as the question of
"whether there is discrimination against foreign commerce." Scandinavian Airlines
Sys. Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 45, 363 P.2d 25, 45, 14 Cal. Rptr.
25, 45, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting). Justice Traynor, dis-
missed the problem as
erroneously attribut[ing] to such taxation the risk of discrimination. Actually it is
attributable to the freedom of foreign countries, not permitted to our own states, to
adopt rules of their own that can result in multiple tax burdens. The court cannot
prevent foreign countries from taxing instrumentalities of foreign commerce own-
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Court found that California's tax must be evaluated "in the realistic
framework of the custom of nations."9 8 Appellees argued that even if
California's tax results in multiple taxation, that fact is insufficient to
condemn a state tax under the Commerce Clause.9 In rejecting this
argument, the Supreme Court found that the instant case involved a
situation where true apportionment did not exist and could not be policed by
the Court at all. "Even a slight overlapping of tax - a problem that might be
deemed de minimus in a domestic context - assumes importance when
sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are con-
cerned." 00
Other arguments support the Supreme Court's position. It has been
stated that:
even if there are no local competitors and so no discrimination in the
ordinary sense, duplicative taxation remains inimical to the open
economy because it places a final premium on confining operations to
one or a few states, thus discouraging multistate operations.,"1
This argument is equally applicable to encumbrances in foreign commerce.
Duplicative taxation in foreign commerce would discourage full trade among
nations and disrupt the open international market. Secondly, unique
considerations are present when vessels or their instrumentalities engage in
international commerce. International carriers spend a considerable amount
ed by their domicilaries even if those instrumentalities are permanently located
here, just as it cannot prevent foreign countries from taxing American aircraft
temporarily abroad even though they have been taxed at full value at the domicile
of their owners here . . . It does not follow that the states must forego the power
to impose taxes that are not in themselves discriminatory . . . Congress remains
free to prohibit altogether state taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce.
Id. at 45, 363 P.2d at 45.
The logic of Justice Traynor's dissent was eventually adopted in Sea Land
Service. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. It was also adopted by the California
court in Japan Line, see supra note 20, and by Justice Rehnquist in Japan Line, 441
U.S. at 457. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. While the argument constitutes
a challenging attack upon the entire framework for analyzing multiple burdens in fore-
ign commerce, the Court in Japan Line found Justice Traynor's focus to be too narrow,
application of the Complete Auto criteria by the Court refutes Traynor's argument. 441
U.S. at 445.
98. 441 U.S. at 454.
99. Id. at 455.
100. Id. at 456.
101. See supra Developments, note 56, at 964.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
of time beyond the territorial limits of all taxing states, and there is at
present, no established rule for apportioning time spent on the high seas. l"
These considerations, and those articulated by the Supreme Court,
indicate the federal interest in avoiding multiple taxation in the area of
foreign commerce. After consideration of the fourfold requirements of
Complete Auto Transit, the presence of multiple tax burdens is enough to
render any state tax upon instrumentalities of foreign commerce unconstitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause. °"
Federal Uniformity
Alternatively, after an examination of Complete Auto Transit's fourfold
requirements, impairment of federal uniformity will similarly render such a
state tax unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause."° The Court in Japan
Line based its argument for the need of federal uniformity in the area of
taxation of foreign commerce upon an argument that the probative reach of
the Commerce Clause is greater in the area of foreign commerce. "Although
the Constitution, Art. I § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate commerce
'with foreign nations' and among 'the several states' in parallel phrases, there
is evidence that the founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce
power to be greater."'"° Constitutional and judicial support for this proposition
is not strong.'" There is, however, authority for the proposition that the
exercise of Congress' authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations
may not be limited, qualified, or impeded to any extent by state action.' 7 The
regulation of "vehicles of commerce by water" is "assumed by the national
legislature."'"2 The Court, relying on Micheline Tire Corp. v. Wages,", phrased
102. Id. at 986.
103. 441 U.S. at 451.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 448.
106. See Note, 11 STAN. L. REV. 518, 525-526 (1959).
107. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56, 57
(1933).
108. Pullmans Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 24 (1891). See supra
notes 45-48, and accompanying text.
109. 423 U.S. 276 (1976). In Michelin, the Court examined the policies animating
the Import Export Clause: "The federal government must speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with toreign governments ... , import revenues were
to be the major source of revenue of the Federal government and should not be diverted
to the state; and harmony among the states might be disturbed unless seaboard states"
• . . were prohibited from trying tax on goods in transit. Id. at 285-286 (footnotes
omitted). The Japan Line court noted that policies animating the Commerce Clause
and the Import Export Clause are much the same. 441 U.S. at 449, n.14.
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the standard as "the Federal Government must speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.""'
Pertinent to the determination that federal uniformity is required is the
possibility of international disputes, the creation of assymetry in the
international tax structure and tax rataliation by foreign countries."'
California's tax . . .creates an assymetry in international maritime
taxation operating to Japan's disadvantage" 2 .. .The risk of retaliation
by Japan . . .is acute . . ."3 Such retaliation of necessity would be
directed at American transportation equipment in general, not just that
of the taxing state, so that the nation as a whole would suffer." '
The Court found that California, by its unilateral act, could not be
permittedly to place these impediments before the nation's conduct of its
foreign relations and its foreign trade."5
Furthermore, the presence of treaties indicating federal executive and
congressional regulation of foreign trade". requires the need for federal
110. 441 U.S. at 449.
111. Id. at 450.
"Retaliation by some nations could be automatic. West Germany's wealth tax sta-
tute, for example, provides an exemption for foreign-owned instrumentalities of
commerce, but only if the owner's country grants a reciprocal exemption for Ger-
man-owned instrumentalities. Vermogensteuergesetz (VStG), Art. 1, § 2(3), re-
printed in I Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBI) 950 (Apr. 23, 1974). The European Econo-
mic Community (EEC), when apprised of California's tax on foreign-owned con-
tainers, apparently determined to consider "suitable counter-measures." Press Re-
lease, Council of the European Communities, 521st Council Meeting - Transport
(Luxembourg, June 12, 1978), p. 21."
Id. at 453, n.21.
112. Id. at 453.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 450. Cf. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1876) (invalidating
California's bond requirement for Chinese immigrants):
[If this plaintiff and her twenty companions had been subjects of the Queen of
Great Britain, can any one doubt that this matter would have been the subject of
international inquiry, if not of a direct claim for redress? Upon whom would such a
claim be made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our Constitution, she can
hold no exterior relations with other nations. It would be made upon the govern-
ment of the United States. If that government should get into a difficulty which
would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer,
or all the Union?
Id. at 450-51 n.16.
115. Id. at 453.
116. Id. at 452.
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uniformity to be considered in the instant case. Under the Customs
Convention on Containers, which the United States and Japan have signed,
containers temporarily imported are admitted free of all duties and taxes
chargeable by importation."7 "The Convention reflects a national policy tQ
remove impediments to the use of containers as 'instruments of international
traffic.' " 8 Were the court to sustain appellees imposition of the tax, other
states would follow California's example. Foreign containers would be
subjected to various degrees of multiple taxation, depending upon which
American ports they enter. The Japan Line court found that this result would
make "speaking with one voice" impossible."9
Appellees argument that any multiple taxation created by the California
tax is capable of being cured by Congressional action or international
agreement'2° was found by the Court to defeat the cause it aimed to
promote.' "For to say that California has created a problem susceptible only
of congressional - indeed, only of international - solution is to concede that
the taxation of foreign-owned containers is an area where a uniform federal
rule is essential."' 2
The Supreme Court also dismissed several policy arguments presented by
appellees 2 3 These arguments included California's loss of revenue, non-
compensation for services the state undeniably renders the containers and
the resulting discrimination to domestic commerce."' The Court, citing Cooley
v. Board of Wardens,"' essentially referred the state to Congress for
resolution of these issues.'26 Perhaps the federal uniformity criteria of Japan
Line is application of the rule of Cooley - whether a commerce problem is one
"admitting of only one uniform system of regulation. 12 Apparently the
Supreme Court is able to elucidate a new standard in the area of state
taxation of the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, but is unable to
provide a federal remedy to appellees commensurate with the issues they
present.
Because either the presence of multiple tax burdens or the need for
federal uniformity could always invalidate a tax levied on instrumentalities
117. See supra note 25.
118. 441 U.S. at 453. See 19 U.S.C. § 1322(2).
119. 441 U.S. at 453.
120. Id. at 454.
121. Id. at 455.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 456-7.
124. Id. at 456-7.
125. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
126. 441 U.S. at 457. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 125.
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of foreign commerce, the two criteria are applied alternatively by the Court
where the entire combination of Japan Line factors are present: foreign-
owned and foreign-based and foreign-registered and engaged solely in foreign
commerce and taxed by the foreign country.'9 In the instant case, the
shipping containers of Japan Line are completely exempt from state taxation
in the United States. The California tax could not withstand scrutiny under
either of the additional criteria that a tax on foreign commerce must
satisfy.' 9 The Court's decision is significant because of the articulation of a
new standard and because the new standard allows the Court to find a
different result wherever the factors are changed - for example, domestical-
ly-owned and based shipping containers engaged in foreign commerce need be
exempt from state taxation only to the extent of taxes actually assessed in
foreign countries.'3"
CONCLUSION
Abandonment of the "Home Port" rule reduces the confusion which
previously prevailed in the area of taxation of international shipping
transportation. This move was necessary if, in fact, the Court is developing a
more unified approach to determining the constitutionality of the exercise of
state taxing power under the commerce clause. The disposition of Japan Line
reflects this intent and reflects the Court's awareness of the need to examine
the practical economic effects of state taxation on the open market. Requiring
application of the Complete Auto test to the area of state ad valorem property
taxation suggests the standard will be applied to any form of state taxation of
commerce. The tax must
1. be applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing
state,
2. be fairly apportioned;
3. not discriminate against interstate commerce; and
4. be fairly related to the services provided by the taxing state.
This standard is both a restraint upon state taxing power and a
guarantee of non-discriminatory treatment to the instrumentalities of
128. 441 U.S. at 444, 451-452.
129. Id. at 451.
130. Thus, courts could avoid a result such as that in Flying Tiger Lines Inc. v.
County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 323 (1958), wherein it was held that
Los Angeles County must forego taxing its domiciliary aircraft to the extent that a
foreign country may do so, even if no tax has in fact been levied by such foreign coun-
try. See generally supra note 88, at 92, 105-106.
interstate and foreign commerce. Consideration of multiple tax burdens and
of the impairment of federal uniformity - either of which is sufficient to
render a state tax unconstitutional - protects federal interests in the area of
foreign commerce. Japan Line is essentially an examination of the practical
effects of state taxation of international commerce. In the instant case, such
taxation was held to be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. The
decision, however, should not be construed as creating an excessively broad
zone of tax immunity. The new standard elucidated in Japan Line leaves the
Court free to find a different result should any factors change.
Marguerite E. Howard
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